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Abstract
We consider adversarial examples for image classifica-
tion in the black-box decision-based setting. Here, an at-
tacker cannot access confidence scores, but only the final
label. Most attacks for this scenario are either unreliable
or inefficient. Focusing on the latter, we show that a specific
class of attacks, Boundary Attacks, can be reinterpreted as
a biased sampling framework that gains efficiency from do-
main knowledge. We identify three such biases, image fre-
quency, regional masks and surrogate gradients, and eval-
uate their performance against an ImageNet classifier. We
show that the combination of these biases outperforms the
state of the art by a wide margin. We also showcase an ef-
ficient way to attack the Google Cloud Vision API, where
we craft convincing perturbations with just a few hundred
queries. Finally, the methods we propose have also been
found to work very well against strong defenses: Our tar-
geted attack won second place in the NeurIPS 2018 Adver-
sarial Vision Challenge.
1. Introduction
Ever since the term was fist coined, adversarial exam-
ples have enjoyed much attention from machine learning
researchers. The fact that tiny perturbations can lead other-
wise robust-seeming models to misclassify an input could
pose a major problem for safety and security. But when dis-
cussing adversarial examples, it is often unclear how realis-
tic the scenario of a proposed attack truly is. In this work,
we consider a threat setting with the following parameters:
Black-box. The black-box setting assumes that an at-
tacker has access only to the input and output of a model.
Compared to the white-box setting, where an attacker has
complete access to the architecture and parameters of the
model, attacks in this setting are significantly harder to con-
duct: Most state-of-the-art white-box attacks [8, 5, 14] rely
on gradients that are directly computed from the model pa-
rameters, which are not available in the black-box setting.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1. (a) and (b): Black-box adversarial examples obtained by
random sampling. (c) and (d): isolated perturbation patterns. (c)
is sampled from a normal distribution, and (d) is sampled from a
distribution of Perlin noise patterns, which is one of the biases we
propose. Both (a) and (b) fool the classifier, but (b) can be obtained
with fewer samples.
Decision-based classification (label-only). Depending
on the output format of the model, the problem of missing
gradients can be circumvented. In a score-based scenario,
the model provides real-valued outputs (for example, soft-
max activations). By applying tiny modifications to the in-
put, an attacker can estimate gradients by observing changes
in the output [6] and then follow this estimate to generate
adversarial examples. The decision-based setting, in con-
trast, provides only a single discrete result (the top-1 label)
on which gradient estimation is very inefficient [10]. This
form of black-box attack is much more difficult, but also
extends the range of possible targets in the real world [3].
Limited queries. Black-box attacks might not be feasi-
ble if they need millions of queries to the model, and pos-
sibly multiple hours’ time, to be successful. We therefore
consider a scenario where the attacker must find a convinc-
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ing adversarial example in less than 15000 queries.
Targeted. An untargeted attack is considered success-
ful when the classification result is any label other than the
original. Depending on the number and semantics of the
classes, it can be easy to find a label that requires little
change, but is considered adversarial (e.g. Egyptian cat vs
Persian cat). A targeted attack, in contrast, needs to produce
exactly the specified label. This task is strictly harder than
the untargeted attack, further decreasing the probability of
success.
In this setting, current state-of-the-art attacks are either
unreliable or inefficient. Our contribution is as follows:
• We show how a recently proposed method, the Bound-
ary Attack, can be re-framed as a biased sampling
framework that gains efficiency from prior beliefs
about the target domain.
• We discuss three such biases: low-frequency patterns,
regional masks and gradients from a surrogate model.
• We evaluate the effectiveness of each bias and show
that their combination drastically outperforms the pre-
vious state of the art in label-only black box attacks.
Our source code is publicly available.1
2. Related Work
There currently exist two major schools of attacks in the
threat setting we consider:
2.1. Transfer-based
It is known that adversarial examples display a high de-
gree of transferability, even between different model ar-
chitectures [20]. Transfer attacks seek to exploit this by
training substitute models that are reasonably similar to the
model under attack, and then apply regular white-box at-
tacks to them.
Typically, this is performed by iterative applications of
fast gradient-based methods such as the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [8] and, more generally, Projected Gradi-
ent Descent (PGD) [14]. The black-box model is used in the
forward pass, while the backward pass is performed with
the surrogate model [1]. In order to maximize the chance of
a successful transfer, newer methods use large ensembles of
substitute models, and applying adversarial training to the
substitute models has been found to increase the probability
of finding strong adversarial examples even further [19].
Although these methods currently form the state of the
art in label-only black-box attacks [12], they have one major
weakness: as soon as a defender manages to reduce trans-
ferability, direct transfer attacks often run a risk of com-
plete failure, delivering no result even after thousands of
1https://github.com/ttbrunner/biased_boundary_
attack
iterations. As a result, conducting transfer attacks is a cat-
and-mouse game between attacker and defender, where the
attacker must go to great lengths to train models that are
just as robust as the defender’s. Therefore, transfer-based
attacks can be very efficient, but also somewhat unreliable.
2.2. Sampling-based
Circumventing this problem, sampling-based attacks do
not rely on direct transfer and instead try to find adversar-
ial examples by randomly sampling perturbations from the
input space.
Perhaps the simplest attack consists of sampling a hy-
persphere around the original image, and drawing more and
more samples until an adversarial example is found. Owing
to the high dimensionality of the input space, this method
is very inefficient and has been dismissed as completely un-
viable [18]. While this is not our main focus, we show in
Appendix C that even this crude attack can be accelerated
and made competitive in certain scenarios.
Recently, a more efficient attack has been proposed: the
Boundary Attack (BA) [3]. This attack is initialized with
an input of the desired class, and then takes small steps
along the decision boundary to reduce the distance to the
original input. Previous works have established that regions
which contain adversarial examples often have the shape of
a ”cone” [19], which can be traversed from start to finish.
At each step, the BA employs random sampling to find a
sideways direction that leads deeper into this cone. From
there, it can then take the next step towards the target.
The BA has been shown to be very powerful, producing
adversarial examples that are competitive with even the re-
sults of state-of-the-art white-box attacks [3]. However, its
weakness is query efficiency: to achieve these results, the
attack typically needs to query a model hundreds of thou-
sands of times.
It should be noted that recent research on black-box at-
tacks has largely focused on classifiers that provide confi-
dence scores, which is an easier setting. Nevertheless, many
of these methods also use random sampling [6, 21, 10], and
the biases we propose could also benefit their approaches.
As an aside, Ilyas et al. [10] propose a variation of their
attack that manages to apply gradient estimation to discrete
labels. Although this does fit our setting, we find it to be
much less efficient than BA variants (see Section 4).
Clearly, sampling-based attacks are very flexible but of-
ten too inefficient for practical use. Barring pure random
guessing, the BA is the simplest attack for our setting. We
therefore choose to focus on this method, and show how it
can benefit from the biases we propose.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2. Sampling directions for the orthogonal step. (a) Boundary Attack: uniformly distributed along the surface of the hypersphere. (b)
BA with Perlin bias: higher sample density in the direction of low-frequency perturbations. (c) BA with surrogate gradient bias: samples
further concentrate towards the direction of the projected gradient.
3. Biased Boundary Attacks
The Boundary Attack, like most sampling-based attacks,
draws perturbation candidates from a multidimensional nor-
mal distribution. This means that it performs unbiased sam-
pling, perturbing each input feature independently of the
others. While this is very flexible, it is also extremely in-
efficient when used against a robust model.
Consider the distribution of natural images: adjacent pix-
els are typically not independent of each other, but often
have similar colors. This alone is a strong indicator that
drawing perturbations from i.i.d random variables will lead
to adversarial examples that are clearly out of distribution
for natural image datasets. This, of course, renders them
vulnerable to detection and filtering - robust models have
become increasingly resilient against such patterns [12].
Therefore, it seems only logical to constrain the search
space to perturbations that we believe to have a higher
chance of success, or to bias the distribution so that the
probability of sampling them increases.
We outline three such biases for the domain of image
classification, discuss their motivation and show how to in-
tegrate them into the sampling procedure of the Boundary
Attack.
3.1. Low-frequency perturbations
When one looks at typical adversarial examples, it
quickly becomes apparent that most existing methods
yield perturbations with high image frequency. But high-
frequency patterns have a significant problem: they are eas-
ily identified and separated from the original image signal,
and are often dampened by spatial transforms. Indeed, most
of the winning defenses in the NeurIPS 2017 Adversarial
Attacks and Defences Competition were based on denois-
ing [13], simple median filters [12], and random transforms
[22]. In other words: state-of-the art defenses are designed
to filter high-frequency noise.
At the same time, we know that it is possible to synthe-
size ”robust” adversarial examples which are not easily fil-
tered in this way. Compare Athalye et al. [2]: Their robust
perturbations are largely invariant to filters and transforms,
and – interestingly enough – at first glance seem to contain
very little high-frequency noise.
Inspired by this observation, we hypothesize that image
frequency alone could be a key factor in robustness of ad-
versarial perturbations. If true, then simply limiting per-
turbations to the low-frequency domain should increase the
success chance of an attack, while incurring no extra cost.
Perlin Noise patterns. A straightforward way to gen-
erate parametrized, low-frequency patterns, is to use Per-
lin Noise [15]. Originally intended as a procedural texture
generator for computer graphics, this function creates low-
frequency noise patterns with a reasonably ”natural” look.
One such pattern can be seen in Figure 1d. But how can we
use it to create a prior for the Boundary Attack?
Let k be the dimensionality of the input space. The orig-
inal Boundary Attack (Figure 2a) works by applying an or-
thogonal perturbation ηk along the surface of a hypersphere
around the original image, in the hope of moving deeper
into an adversarial region. From there, a step is taken to-
wards the original image. In the default configuration, can-
didates for ηk are generated from samples s ∼ N (0, 1)k,
which are projected orthogonally to the source direction and
normalized to the desired step size. This leads to the direc-
tions being uniformly distributed along the hypersphere.
To introduce a low-frequency prior into the Bound-
ary Attack, we instead sample from a distribution of Per-
lin noise patterns (Figure 2b). Perlin noise is typically
parametrized with a permutation vector v of size 256, which
we randomly shuffle on every call. Effectively, this al-
lows us to sample two-dimensional noise patterns s ∼
Perlinh,w(v), where h and w are the image dimensions
(and h · w = k). As a result, the samples are now strongly
concentrated in low-frequency directions.
Our experiments in Section 4 show that this greatly im-
proves the efficiency of the attack. Therefore, we rea-
son that the distribution of Perlin noise patterns contains a
higher concentration of adversarial directions than the nor-
mal distribution.
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Figure 3. Masking based on per-pixel difference. (a) shows the
original image, (b) an image of the target class. (c) is the mask,
and (d) is a perturbation to which the mask has been applied. The
perturbation concentrates on the central region, as the background
is already quite similar between the images.
3.2. Regional masking
Currently, perturbations are evenly applied across the en-
tire image. No matter if low or high frequency, the orthog-
onal step of the Boundary Attack perturbs all pixels nearly
equally (when averaged over a large number of samples).
This seems to be a waste – could the attack benefit from
limiting the perturbation to specific regions?
The Boundary Attack is an interpolation from an image
of the target class towards the image under attack. In some
regions, these images might already be quite similar, while
being very different in others. Intuitively, we would want
an attack to take larger steps in those regions where the dif-
ference is high. We are also reluctant to perturb regions that
are already similar, as any such distortion will have to be
undone in a later step.
It turns out that this is an ideal way to reduce the search
space. We can simply create an image mask from the per-
pixel difference of the adversarial and original image (see
Figure 3):
M = |Xadv −Xorig| (1)
At each step, we recalculate this mask based on the cur-
rent position and apply it element-wise to the previously
sampled orthogonal perturbation ηk:
ηkbiased = M  ηk; ηkbiased =
ηkbiased
‖ηkbiased‖
(2)
In this way, the distortion of those pixels that have a
high difference is amplified and that of similar pixels damp-
ened, while the magnitude of the perturbation vector stays
the same.
This reduces the search space of the attack and therefore
increases its efficiency – if one assumes our intuition about
regional masking to be correct. We implement this masking
strategy as a proof of concept and our evaluation in Section
4 shows that it indeed improves efficiency by a significant
amount.
Other masks. An attacker might wish to engineer masks
from other knowledge they possess about the image con-
tents. For example, it could be worthwhile to concentrate
the perturbation on the most salient features of the target
class, reducing the search space to only the most vital di-
mensions. Such ”focused” black-box perturbations could
hold much promise, and we aim to investigate them in the
future.
3.3. Gradients from surrogate models
What other source of information contains strong hints
about directions that are likely to point to an adversarial re-
gion? Naturally – gradients from surrogate models. Trans-
fer attacks have been shown to be extremely powerful (al-
beit brittle) [19], so it should be useful to exploit surrogates
whenever they are available.
Arguably, the main weakness of transfer attacks is that
they fail when the decision boundary of the surrogate model
does not closely match the defender’s. However, even when
this is the case, the boundary may still be reasonably nearby.
Based on this intuition, some approaches extend gradient-
based attacks with limited regional sampling [1]. Here, we
do exactly the opposite and extend a sampling-based attack
with limited gradient information. This has the significant
advantage that, in the case of low transferability, our method
merely experiences a slowdown where typical transfer at-
tacks completely fail.
Our method works as follows:
• An adversarial gradient from a surrogate model is cal-
culated. Since the current position is already adversar-
ial, it can be helpful to move a small distance towards
the original image first, making sure to calculate the
gradient from inside a non-adversarial region.
• The gradient usually points away from the original im-
age, therefore we project it orthogonally to the source
direction, as shown in Figure 2c.
• This projection is on the same hyperplane as the can-
didates for the orthogonal step. We can now bias the
candidate perturbations toward the projected gradient
by any method of our choosing. Provided all vectors
are normalized, we opt for simple addition:
ηkbiased = (1− w) · ηk + w · ηkPG (3)
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• w controls the strength of the bias and is a hyperparam-
eter that should be tuned according to the performance
of our substitute model. High values for w should be
used when transferability is high, and vice versa. Were
we to choose the maximum value, w = 1, then the or-
thogonal step would be equivalent to an iteration of
the PGD attack. In our experience, w ≤ 0.5 generally
leads to good performance.
As a result, samples concentrate in the vicinity of the
projected gradient, but still cover the rest of the search space
(albeit with lower resolution). In this way, substitute mod-
els are purely optional to our attack instead of forming the
central part. It should be noted though that at least some
measure of transferability should exist. Otherwise, the gra-
dient will point in a bogus direction and using a high value
for w would reduce efficiency instead of improving it.
For the time being, this does not pose a major problem.
To the best of our knowledge, no strategies exist that suc-
cessfully eliminate transferability altogether. As we go on
to show in Section 4, even surrogate models that are too
weak for direct transfer attacks can be used in our frame-
work.
3.4. Concurrent work
Our work is concurrent with Ilyas et al. [11], who
introduce a bandit optimization framework that incorpo-
rates prior information in order to increase query efficiency.
While their approach differs from ours, it is motivated by
the same intuition - domain knowledge can be used to speed
up optimization. We note that the data-dependent prior they
propose is essentially a low-frequency bias not unlike our
own. They also introduce a time-dependent prior, which
could benefit our work in the future.
Low-frequency perturbations have also recently been de-
scribed by Guo et al. [9]. They decompose random pertur-
bations with the Discrete Cosine Transform, and then re-
move high frequencies from the spectrum. We expect these
patterns to be very similar to those produced by our Perlin
bias.
4. Evaluation
We evaluate our approach against an ImageNet classifier
and perform an ablation study to determine the effectiveness
of each bias. We also compare our results to a range of
recently proposed black-box attacks. Finally, we mount an
attack against the Google Cloud Vision API and show that
our approach can be efficiently deployed against real-world
commercial systems.
Appendix A shows a range of interesting examples pro-
duced by our attacks, Appendix B contains a listing of hy-
perparameters and Appendix C describes our winning sub-
mission to the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge
in detail.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 4. Targeted attack on ImageNet using 15000 queries. (a)
shows the original image (bell) and (b) an image of the target class
(ocarina). (c) is an adversarial example generated by the original
Boundary Attack (d`2 = 18.52), with (d) showing the difference
to the original image. (e) and (f) show the biased Boundary Attack
with all biases enabled (d`2 = 4.78)
4.1. ImageNet
ImageNet consists of images with 299x299 color pixels
and has 1000 classes. We run our attacks against a pre-
trained InceptionV3 network [17], which achieves 78% top-
1 accuracy.
Evaluation. We create an evaluation set by randomly se-
lecting 1000 images from the ImageNet validation set while
fixing a random target label for each image. We then pro-
ceed to run each attack for up to 15000 queries and measure
the success rate over all examples.
Success criteria. The Boundary Attack always starts
with an image of the adversarial class, therefore success
must be characterized by low distance to the original image.
For this, we define a threshold on the `2-norm of the adver-
sarial perturbation and register success when the distance is
below. Since some of the methods we compare [10] use `∞
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ACTIVE BIASES SUCCESS RATE VS NUMBER OF QUERIES MEDIAN QUERIES
PERLIN MASK SURROGATE 500 1000 2500 5000 10000 15000 UNTIL SUCCESS
NO NO NO 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.25 0.33 -
YES NO NO 0.03 0.08 0.18 0.31 0.47 0.57 10826
NO YES NO 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.22 0.35 0.44 -
YES YES NO 0.04 0.09 0.25 0.46 0.72 0.80 5485
NO NO YES 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.29 0.38 -
YES NO YES 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.32 0.50 0.60 10277
NO YES YES 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.26 0.38 0.49 -
YES YES YES 0.04 0.10 0.29 0.48 0.69 0.85 5432
Table 1. Ablation study of biases on ImageNet (targeted attack). The Perlin bias has the strongest effect, followed by the mask bias and
finally the surrogate bias. Each bias improves efficiency on its own, and the combination of all biases delivers the strongest performance.
Note: we only report the median for success rates over 0.5.
SUCCESS RATE VS NUMBER OF QUERIES
METHOD 500 1000 2500 5000 10000 15000
ILYAS ET AL. [10] (LABEL-ONLY) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CHENG ET AL. [7] 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07
MADRY ET AL. [14] (PGD TRANSFER ATTACK) 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
BRENDEL ET AL. [3] (UNBIASED BOUNDARY ATTACK) 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.25 0.33
OURS (BIASED BOUNDARY ATTACK) 0.04 0.10 0.29 0.48 0.69 0.85
Table 2. Comparison with recently proposed label-only attacks. We use the original code provided by the respective authors and run all
methods with the same data and targets. The biased Boundary Attack (same as in Table 1) outperforms all other methods. Note that in the
case of Ilyas et al.[10], the number of required queries is so large that the attack never achieves success in the range we consider.
distance exclusively, we set the `2-threshold to 25.89. This
corresponds to a worst-case `∞-distortion of 0.05 if one as-
sumes all pixels to be maximally perturbed.
Initialization. We search the ImageNet validation set for
an image of the target class, and pick the one that is closest
to the one being attacked. From there, we perform a binary
line search to find the decision boundary. This is typically
done in less than 10 queries. We run all attacks with the
same starting points.
Surrogate model. We use a pre-trained Inception-
Resnet-v2 model [16] for the gradient bias. This model is
not adversarially trained and, as Table 2 shows, performs
poorly in a PGD transfer attack. We intentionally use this
model to demonstrate that our approach can effectively use
pre-trained surrogates without any need for modification.
Hyperparameters. See Appendix B.
4.1.1 Ablation study of biases
We first evaluate all three biases and their combinations. Ta-
ble 1 shows the result: it is apparent that each of the biases
increases the efficiency of the attack. The largest boost is
obtained by the Perlin bias, followed by the mask bias, and
finally the surrogate gradient bias.
The latter has a rather small effect, which is probably due
to the fact that our surrogate model is too weak. But still,
we are able to use what little transferability there is instead
of slowing down (or failing like a transfer attack would). At
this point, it would be interesting to see whether our method
could profit even more from better surrogates. We consider
this a direction for future work.
It is also noteworthy that all biases can be combined, and
that they do not interfere with each other. When all three
biases are active, we reach 85% success after only 15000
queries. Figure 4 shows an example of this drastic improve-
ment. This is our strongest attack, which we now compare
against other state-of-the-art methods.
4.1.2 Comparison to state of the art
We go on to benchmark our method against a range of re-
cently proposed attacks for our setting. We use publicly
available code, together with the hyperparameters recom-
mended by the authors. We modify the implementations to
use our evaluation set, therefore all attacks are run on the
same 1000 images and use the same target labels as well
as starting points (where applicable). Table 2 shows the re-
sults.
Ilyas et al. [10] propose a label-only version of their
gradient estimation attack. It works in our setting, but at
greatly reduced efficiency. We note that it does not produce
an adversarial example within 15000 queries and that no
run succeeds before 276000 queries, with a median of 2.48
million queries required. This is in line with their published
results. Their other attacks use confidence scores, and there-
fore require a setting that is considerably easier. Even then,
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our median number of queries is decisively lower than the
one reported by them (5432 versus 11550).
Similarly, Cheng et al. [7] re-frame the setting as a real-
valued optimization problem. In general, they report higher
efficiency than the Boundary Attack, which is not confirmed
in the setting of our experiment. We used their publicly
available source code with recommended hyperparameters.
Finally, we perform an iterative PGD transfer attack as
described by Madry et al. [14]. Our results show that
its performance is hit-and-miss: when a transfer succeeds
it does so very early, but in most cases it never succeeds.
Clearly this attack requires a stronger surrogate model.
Interestingly enough, the performance we obtain for the
original Boundary Attack (without biases) seems higher
than that observed in previous work [3, 7]. This may be
due to our initialization method or our choice of hyperpa-
rameters, which we list in Appendix B. In any case, our
evaluation shows that the biased Boundary Attack decid-
edly outperforms all other attacks in a label-only setting.
4.2. Google Cloud Vision API
To show that our method is effective even against black
boxes with unknown labels, we conduct an attack against
the Google Cloud Vision API. This is significantly harder
than attacking ImageNet, since the exact classes are un-
known. However, we also note that Google Cloud Vision
has a very high number of near-redundant class labels. Do
we really need to focus on one label alone?
Free-form attacks. We have argued earlier that untar-
geted attacks with many redundant classes are not truly ad-
versarial. However, the opposite is also true: to achieve an
adversarial effect, it is not always necessary to target one
specific class. Rather, the same effect could be achieved by
targeting a group of classes – if we want to label a dog as
a cat, we can take the union of all cat breeds to achieve the
desired effect.
To be more precise, we can formulate any adversarial
criterion, as long as it is a boolean function of the model
output. Decision-based attacks make this very simple: if
we consider this function to be part of the black box, we
can simply treat it like any other model and run our attack
on its output.
4.2.1 Turning a person into a bear
Consider, for example, a targeted attack to turn a person into
a bear. Instead of using the label ”bear”, we perform a string
comparison on the top-1 label and check for the occurrence
of ”bear”. This extends the attack to labels like ”grizzly
bear”, ”brown bear”, etc. and keeps it from getting stuck
whenever one of these labels appears in top-1 position. We
also add another condition for good measure: the words
Figure 5. Adversarial image (target ”bear”), classified by Google
Cloud Vision after 346 queries. Confidence scores are displayed,
but not used by the attack. No label hinting at a person is left (the
prediction vector contains only 3 labels).
”face”, ”facial expression”, ”skin”, ”person” must not ap-
pear in any of the output labels.
Figure 5 shows the result: after only 346 iterations, our
attack produces a perturbation that is still visible, but small
enough to fool an unsuspecting person.
Figure 6. Adversarial image (pedestrians have been removed),
classified by Google Cloud Vision after exactly 1000 queries.
Confidence scores are displayed, but not used by the attack. Per-
haps interestingly, our adversarial pattern is classified as ”Fun”.
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4.2.2 Making pedestrians disappear
The adversarial criterion can also be formulated as a top-k
untargeted attack on multiple labels. Consider a potentially
safety-critical scenario, where the goal is to make the model
oblivious to pedestrians. For this, we simply formulate the
condition so that the string ”pedestrian” does not appear in
the prediction vector, and that related labels such as ”per-
son, walking, head, clothes” are also absent.
We obtain Figure 6 after exactly 1000 queries. Again, the
perturbation is already small enough to fool an unsuspecting
observer. An attack with such a low number of queries can
be performed on virtually any device – even mobile – in a
matter of minutes, and is only limited by the latency of the
API under attack.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that decision-based black-box attacks
can be greatly sped up with prior knowledge. The Bound-
ary Attack can be interpreted as a biased sampling frame-
work where one merely needs to modify the distribution
from which samples are drawn.
Within this framework, we have proposed three priors
that are partially motivated by intuitions about the nature of
image classification, and partially by a desire to connect re-
search directions in the field of black-box attacks. Consider
the surrogate gradient bias: by itself, it does not yield a sub-
stantial improvement. However, the observation that we are
able to draw even a small benefit from surrogates that oth-
erwise show near-zero transferability seems very promising
for future work. We aim to study this effect of partial trans-
ferability in more detail and hope to uncover some of its
underlying properties.
And it does not end here - we have discussed only three
priors for biased sampling, but there is much more domain
knowledge that has not yet found its way into adversarial
attacks. Other perturbation patterns, spatial transforms, ad-
versarial blending strategies, or even intuitions about se-
mantic features of the target class could all be integrated
in a similar fashion.
With the biased Boundary Attack, we have outlined a ba-
sic framework into which a broad range of knowledge can
be incorporated. Our implementation significantly outper-
forms the previous state of the art in black-box label-only
attacks, which is one of the most difficult settings currently
considered. Our methods can be used to craft convincing
results after very few iterations, and the threat of black-box
adversarial examples becomes more realistic than ever be-
fore.
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A. Evaluation images
No bias Surrogate bias only Mask bias only Mask+Surrogate
d`2 = 27.10 d`2 = 21.73 d`2 = 13.19 d`2 = 12.40
Perlin bias only Perlin+Surrogate Perlin+Mask Perlin+Mask+Surrogate
d`2 = 20.40 d`2 = 17.89 d`2 = 8.79 d`2 = 8.28
Original image Starting point
Figure 7. Targeted adversarial examples on ImageNet, obtained with different biases after 15000 iterations. The original class is ”snow-
plow” – all images are classified as the target ”Chesapeake Bay retriever”. The mask bias is especially effective, as start and original image
have similar backgrounds. See https://github.com/ttbrunner/biased_boundary_attack for an animated version.
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No bias Surrogate bias only Mask bias only Mask+Surrogate
d`2 = 42.36 d`2 = 40.51 d`2 = 42.69 d`2 = 41.69
Perlin bias only Perlin+Surrogate Perlin+Mask Perlin+Mask+Surrogate
d`2 = 34.92 d`2 = 35.19 d`2 = 12.37 d`2 = 10.54
Original image Starting point
Figure 8. Targeted adversarial examples on ImageNet, obtained with different biases after 15000 iterations. The original class is ”goose”
– all images are classified as the target ”lipstick”. In the case of this image, not every bias comes with an improvement: mask+surrogate
is even slightly worse than surrogate only. However, when all biases are combined the result is still significantly better. See https:
//github.com/ttbrunner/biased_boundary_attack for an animated version.
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No bias Surrogate bias only Mask bias only Mask+Surrogate
d`2 = 47.36 d`2 = 57.74 d`2 = 40.10 d`2 = 41.84
Perlin bias only Perlin+Surrogate Perlin+Mask Perlin+Mask+Surrogate
d`2 = 12.20 d`2 = 11.46 d`2 = 8.56 d`2 = 5.90
Original image Starting point
Figure 9. Targeted adversarial examples on ImageNet, obtained with different biases after 15000 iterations. The original class is ”cello” –
all images are classified as the target ”black stork”. When used on its own, the surrogate bias seems to be detrimental for this particular
image. Still, the final result is impressive: when comparing no biases with all biases, the perturbation norm is reduced by 88%. See
https://github.com/ttbrunner/biased_boundary_attack for an animated version.
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B. Evaluation Hyperparameters
B.1. Boundary Attack
Step sizes. In the source code of their original implementation, Brendel et al. [3] suggest setting both the orthogonal step
to η = 0.01 and the source step to  = 0.01. Both step sizes are relative to the current distance from the source image. We
instead set η = 0.05 and  = 0.002, as this makes the attack take smaller steps towards the source image, while at the same
time allowing for more extreme perturbations in the orthogonal step. We have found this to increase the success chance of
perturbation candidates, and the attack gets stuck less often.
Step size adaptation. We do not use the original step size adjustment scheme as proposed by Brendel et al. [3]. They collect
statistics about the success of the orthogonal step before performing the step towards the source, and based on this they either
reduce or increase the individual step sizes.
This method seems to be geared towards reaching near-zero perturbations and less towards query efficiency, which is our
primary goal – we are interested in making as much progress as possible in the early stages of an attack. When testing the
Boundary Attack with query counts below 15000, we found the success statistics to be very noisy and the adaptation scheme
ended up being detrimental. Therefore, we opt for a different approach:
• At every iteration, we count the number of consecutive previously unsuccessful candidates.
• As this number increases, we dynamically reduce both step sizes towards zero.
• Whenever a perturbation is successful, the step size is reset to its original value.
• As a fail-safe, the step size is also reset after 50 consecutive failures. Typically, we found this to occur often for the
unbiased Boundary Attack, but very seldom when using the Perlin bias.
As a result, our strategy is quick to reduce step size, and after success immediately reverts to the original step size. We have
found this to be very effective in the early stages of an attack. However, it has the drawback of wasting samples in the later
stages (10000+ queries), when it tries to revert to larger step sizes too often. It might be promising to partially reinstate the
approach of Brendel et al., or to apply some form of step size annealing.
B.2. Other attacks
For all other attacks, we use the hyperparameters that are provided for ImageNet in the publicly available source code of their
implementations.
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C. Submission to NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge
When evaluating adversarial attacks and defenses, it is hard to obtain meaningful results. Very often, attacks are tested against
weak defenses and vice versa, and results are cherry-picked. We sidestep this problem by instead presenting our submission
to the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge (AVC), where our method was pitted against state-of-the-art robust models
and defenses and won second place in the targeted attack track.
Evaluation setting. The AVC is an open competition between image classifiers and adversarial attacks in an iterative black-
box decision-based setting [4]. Participants can choose between three tracks:
• Robust model: The submitted code is a robust image classifier. The goal is to maximize the `2 norm of any successful
adversarial perturbation.
• Untargeted attack: The submitted code must find a perturbation that changes classifier output, while minimizing the `2
distance to the original image.
• Targeted attack: Same as above, but the classification must be changed to a specific label.
Attacks are continuously evaluated against the current top-5 robust models and vice versa. Each evaluation run consists
of 200 images with a resolution of 64x64, and the attacker is allowed to query the model 1000 times for each image. The
final attack score is then determined by the median `2 norm of the perturbation over all 200 images and top-5 models (lower
is better).
Competitors. At the time of writing, the exact methods of most model submissions were not yet published. But seeing as
more than 60 teams competed in the challenge, it is reasonable to assume that the top-5 models accurately depicted the state
of the art in adversarial robustness. We know from personal correspondence that most winning models used variations of
Ensemble Adversarial Training [19], while denoisers were notably absent. On the attack side, most winners used variants of
PGD transfer attacks, again in combination with large adversarially-trained ensembles.
Dataset. The models are trained with the Tiny ImageNet dataset, which is a down-scaled version of the ImageNet classifica-
tion dataset, limited to 200 classes with 500 images each. Model input consists of color images with 64x64 pixels, and the
output is one of 200 labels. The evaluation is conducted with a secret hold-out set of images, which is not contained in the
original dataset and unknown to participants of the challenge.
C.1. Random guessing with low frequency
Before implementing the biased Boundary Attack, we first conduct a simple experiment to demonstrate the effectiveness
of Perlin noise patterns against strong defenses. Specifically, we run a random-guessing attack that samples candidates
uniformly from the surface of a `2-hypersphere with radius  around the original image:
s ∼ N (0, 1)k; xadv = x0 +  · s‖s‖2 (4)
With a total budget of 1000 queries to the model for each image, we use binary search to reduce the sampling distance 
whenever an adversarial example is found. First experiments have indicated that the targeted setting may be too difficult for
pure random guessing. Therefore we limit this experiment to the untargeted attack track, where the probability of randomly
sampling any of 199 adversarial labels is reasonably high. We then replace the distribution with normalized Perlin noise:
s ∼ Perlin64,64(v); xadv = x0 +  · s‖s‖2 (5)
We set the Perlin frequency to 5 for all attacks on Tiny ImageNet. As Table 3 shows, Perlin patterns are more efficient and the
attack finds adversarial perturbations with much lower distance (63% reduction). Although intended as a dummy submission
to the AVC, this attack was already strong enough for a top-10 placement in the untargeted track. An example obtained in
this experiment can be seen in Figure 1.
C.2. Biased Boundary Attack
Next, we evaluate the biased Boundary Attack in our intended setting, the targeted attack track in the AVC. To provide a point
of reference, we first implement the original Boundary Attack without biases. This works, but is too slow for our setting.
Compare Figure 10, where the starting point is still clearly visible after 1000 iterations (in the unbiased case).
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DISTRIBUTION MEDIAN `2
NORMAL 11.15
PERLIN NOISE 4.28
Table 3. Random guessing with low frequency (untargeted),
evaluated against the top-5 models in the AVC.
BOUNDARY ATTACK BIAS MEDIAN `2
NONE 20.2
PERLIN 15.1
PERLIN + SURROGATE GRADIENTS 9.5
Table 4. Biases for the Boundary Attack (targeted), evaluated
against the top-5 models in the AVC.
Original Unbiased Perlin Perlin + Surrogate
European fire salamander Sulphur butterfly Sulphur butterfly Sulphur butterfly
Starting image d`2 = 9.4 d`2 = 7.5 d`2 = 4.4
Figure 10. Adversarial examples generated with different biases in our targeted attack submission to the AVC. All images were obtained
after 1000 queries. The isolated perturbation is shown below each adversarial example.
Perlin bias. We add our first bias, low-frequency noise. As before, we simply replace the distribution from which the attack
samples the orthogonal step with Perlin patterns. See Table 4, where this alone decreases the median `2 distance by 25%.
Surrogate gradient bias. We also add projected gradients from a surrogate model and set the bias strength w to 0.5. This
further reduces the median `2 distance by another 37%, or a total of 53% when compared with the original Boundary Attack.
1000 iterations are enough to make the butterfly almost invisible to the human eye (see Figure 10).
Here, the efficiency boost is much larger than in our ImageNet evaluation in Section 4. This may be due to our choice
of surrogate models: In our submission to the AVC, we simply combined the publicly available baselines (ResNet18 and
ResNet50). This ensemble is notably stronger than the simple model we used for the ImageNet evaluation, as the ResNet50
model is adversarially trained. However, it is also significantly weaker than the ones used by other winning AVC attack
submissions, most of which were found to use much larger ensembles of carefully-trained models.2 Nevertheless, our attack
outperformed most of them which reinforces our earlier claim: Our method seems to make more efficient use of surrogate
models than direct transfer attacks.
Mask Bias. We did not implement the mask bias in our entry to the AVC because of time constraints.
The source code of our submission is publicly available.3
2https://medium.com/bethgelab/results-of-the-nips-adversarial-vision-challenge-2018-e1e21b690149
3https://github.com/ttbrunner/biased_boundary_attack_avc
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